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Abstract
We go into the need for, and the requirements on, a formal theory of budgets.
We present a simple algebraic theory of rational budgets, i.e., budgets in which
amounts of money are specified by functions on the rational numbers. This theory
is based on the tuplix calculus. We go into the importance of using totalized models
for the rational numbers. We present a case study on the educational budget of a
university department offering master programs.
1 Introduction
The process of budget design and financial accounting is becoming increasingly spe-
cialized and exclusive. Unfortunately, the need for an underlying theory seems to be
unrecognized. Economic theories of finance do not provide the simple insights needed
for managing small-scale operations. We are currently witnessing the following devel-
opments.
1. Financial work takes place in a context of complex IT support systems, which
are often poorly documented from a user perspective. Documentation is typi-
cally limited to user manuals, and does not give conceptual descriptions of the
underlying budget theory and financial theories.
2. Financial competence is easily confused with the ability to operate certain finan-
cial systems. Because these systems are increasingly complex, the competence
to use them is becoming scarce and requires training and experience. Neverthe-
less that competence need not imply any deeper awareness of the variation of
business logics that may or may not be served with a given system.
3. Financial planning is at the basis of many complex organizational transforma-
tions. Its logic is intimately connected with novel structural changes such as
outsourcing, insourcing, backsourcing and offshoring. Organizational changes
are often correlated with changes in budget logic.
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In this situation, we find it worthwhile to explore the applicability of modeling tech-
niques developed in the fields of information science and software engineering. Unlike
software architecture, financial architecture seems to be a subject to which relatively
little attention is paid. It is worth an effort to apply system description techniques from
computer science to financial systems and to facilitate systematic and correct reasoning
about them. We believe that financial architecture can profit from the same develop-
ment strategy as software architecture by making use of a basis of design patterns and
by developing very clear modularization techniques.
In the other direction, we imagine a formalization of budgets to be a helpful ingre-
dient for the development of sourcing theory (see for instance [5] and [6]). Sourcing
theory requires the presence of so-called business cases for insourcer and outsourcer
to be available and scrutinized before any deal is made. After outsourcing has been
executed, services are expected to be delivered in accordance with an SLA (Service
Level Agreement). Budget information is an essential part of any SLA. No complete
theory of sourcing is possible without some theory of SLAs and their underlying bud-
gets. SLAs constitute a relatively new topic in computing and their meta-theory is
still in an initial stage. We expect that SLAs, or similar entities existing within a fur-
ther evolved terminology, will become a central cornerstone of the emerging theory of
service-oriented computing.
Overview. In this article we define a simple algebraic theory of rational budgets,
that is, budgets in which amounts of money are specified by functions on the rational
numbers. For this theory we borrow from our experience with process algebras (mod-
eling the behavior of computer systems) and abstract data types. In Section 2 we go
into the use of rational functions, and in particular on the importance of totalized mod-
els for the rational numbers when defining them as an abstract data type. In Section 3
we reflect on the formalization of budgets, and this is followed by a simple theory of
budgets in Section 4. We use the so-called tuplix calculus [2] to model budgets. In
Section 5 we present a case study on the educational budget of a university department
offering master programs.
2 Rational Numbers
It is a common misunderstanding that because budget figures are to be understood as
measuring quantities of money expressed in terms of known currencies all semantic
problems will disappear. The issue is comparable to a program notation designed for
programming computations on natural numbers. In spite of the seemingly clear mathe-
matical basis of the program notation, in the absence of a formally specified semantics
of the program notation at hand, nothing much can be said about what transformations
on natural numbers a specific program denotes.
For the definition of a budget the data type of rational numbers is considered of cen-
tral importance. All financial quantities will me measured in exact rational numbers. If
the question arises what exactly are the rational numbers we refer to [3] which provides
a novel and concise initial algebra specification of this classical mathematical structure.
We hold that division plays an important role in budgeting, because of the need to dis-
tribute expected costs over a number of expected users. If ten users will make mutually
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comparable use of a single shared service each of them will be expected to pay 10% of
its costs unless more specific information is available. Interestingly, division seems not
to feature in accounting and bookkeeping. In [3], division is given a first class status
with an operator symbol reserved for it, very much like addition, multiplication and
subtraction. Moreover we will insist, against conventional practice, that division is a
total operator. This leads to ‘meadows’ of rational numbers: a meadow is the well-
know algebraic structure ‘field’ with a total operator for division, so that division by
zero produces some value in the domain of the field. In a zero-totalized field division
is made total by choosing zero as the result of division by zero (and, for example, in a
47-totalized field one has chosen 47 to represent the result of all divisions by zero).
The relevance for our theory of budgets is this: budgets will contain expressions
for rational functions rather than ‘closed’ figures in full (fixed point) precision. From
the conventional perspective on rational numbers, these functions may be undefined
for certain input values, namely, for values leading to devision by zero. In general, it
will be far from trivial to decide whether functions are always defined, and, if not, to
establish the values for which it is. On the other side, the meadow of rational numbers
constitutes a total algebra with trivial type-checking properties, that provides us with a
clear meaning of expressions. This will be of the highest importance to our endeavor,
because just like in the case of specifying computer programs, there will be no way to
avoid explicit syntax and type-checking of expressions.
A down-side of working with zero-totalized fields is that some calculations will
produce useless results. In most cases the occurrence of division by zero in the course
of a calculation still indicates the presence of an error somewhere and error detection
techniques will be needed. Nevertheless the meta-theory of this form of error detection
is considered far simpler than the meta-theory of partial algebras, thus creating a trade-
off to the advantage of the use of calculation in zero-totalized fields.
A small digression: one might wonder why the issue to define division by zero is
so easily avoided in school mathematics and its academic sequel. The answer is that in
mathematics most specialists make no distinction between syntax and semantics. No
syntactic expression is entitled to any attention on the sole grounds of its formal exis-
tence. If syntax is used its use follows the development of semantics and there always
is an intended meaning. Realistically, the question ‘what is the intended meaning of
that piece of syntax’ cannot be even posed. A reluctance to separate syntax and seman-
tics may become a weakness when concepts need to be defined which are viewed as
constructs of a syntactic nature consisting of parts rooted in classical mathematics.
3 Theory and Practice of Budgets
A crucial point in the design of a formal theory of budgets is the following separation
of concerns. Our task is to give a conceptual, mathematical definition of budgets. This
definition (of what a budget is) should be as much as possible independent of how and
why budgets are used. A budget will not be assigned a behavior of its own a priori.
One wants to avoid definitions like ‘natural numbers are a very practical concept that
has been in use since the need arose to count sheep, for which natural numbers turn out
to work very well fortunately.’ Clearly budgets are artifacts of a human origin, and, as
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in the case of natural numbers or data bases, their use is independent of the artifact at
hand.
We believe that a formal theory of budgets is essential to the analysis and improve-
ment of their use. Some examples:
(1) The practice of budget design can be compared to the practice of computer
programming: in general programmers have no means available to know in advance
what computers will do with their writings. This uncertainty is mainly due to a lack-
ing theoretical basis but equally to a common ethos which acts against the use of that
theoretical basis even if it happens to exist and if it might be readily available at rea-
sonable costs. In computer programming, testing is the main though unconvincing tool
to fight this form of uncertainty. In budget design the concept of testing is significantly
harder to imagine, however. Budgets seem to be submitted to a number of static checks
only. Then after their use some form of evaluation and assessment may produce new
guidelines (design rules) for budgeting and new budgets will be matched with these
new design rules as well. Budget testing comparable to dynamic testing of control
code will require a simulation environment. That environment is quite specific to an
organization and most organizations have no such tool available to them at the time of
this writing. Clearly, budget simulation is a hopeless endeavor without a formal theory
of budgets.
(2) Irrespective of the objectives a budget designer has in mind when writing a bud-
get, it will evolve through a life-cycle. An organization may prescribe this life-cycle
to its budget designers in very much the same way as a software life-cycle may play a
normative role in a computer software production factory. Like a machine control code
can be active (running, executing) a budget can be used to control events within an
organization. We would hope that when we start with a clear formal definition, we may
be able to explain (at least in principle) how that form of control might work. Also,
as budgets are often very context-specific, they may be compared to dedicated com-
puter programs. Renewing a budget on an annual basis may be compared to computer
software maintenance (although that comparison may well underestimate the degree of
innovation that a new budget requires).
(3) When hard-pressed to qualify the writing of a budget, the following viewpoint
might be reasonable: budgets are proposed in a context in which their proposal is best
viewed as a move from the side of its author in a game which is implicitly present in
the mentioned context. Let us assume that a budget is designed for an activity called A.
After having been designed and worked out in detail, the distribution of a budget can be
considered a move in a game. By introducing a budget proposal the decision-making
process is somehow influenced. One may assume that this process will eventually lead
to a validated budget for activity A. The budget proposal may impact the style of
budget design which will be adopted for A and for similar activities. The intriguing
observation is that when time has come to write budgets for A, many different and
competing budget proposals may be simultaneously put forward. Thus at budget design
time there is no such thing as ‘the budget’ in very much the same way as a computer
program under construction leaves open many degrees of freedom. It may be fruitful
to experiment with writing quite different budgets for the financial control of a single
activity A. Again, such analysis of the practice of budgeting should start with a formal
theory of budgets.
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4 A Simple Budget Algebra
We present a simple algebra for rational budgets. This algebra is an application of the
so-called tuplix calculus [2]. A tuplix (plural: tuplices) is a datastructure that collects
attribute-value pairs. The tuplix calculus provides signature and axioms for various
operations on budgets, including a means to express constraints on budgets, the com-
position of budgets, and encapsulation. So, budgets will be given by means of tuplix
expressions. The design of user-friendly syntax for budget expressions is outside the
scope of this paper. However, the definition of budgets as tuplices provides a rudimen-
tary syntax which will suffice for explanatory purposes.
4.1 Entries and Tests
The basic building blocks of budgets are entries and tests. An entry is an attribute-value
pair of the form
a(p)
where a is an attribute from a given set A of attribute symbols, and p is a data term.
For the values we use the data type of rational numbers, which we assume to be given
by a zero-totalized field as explained in Section 2 (so p/q is always defined). An entry
represents a payment: the attribute is used in the communication between payer and
payee, and describes or identifies a transaction; we refer to the attribute as the channel
of the transaction, and shall also say that the payment occurs along the channel. The
term p represents the amount of money involved. An entry a(p) with p > 0 stands
for an obligation to pay amount p along channel a. If p < 0, the entry stands for the
expected receipt of amount p along a.
A zero test is a term of the form
γ(p)
for amount p. It acts as a conditional: if the argument p equals zero, then the test is
void and disappears from compositions; if the test is not equal to zero, it nullifies any
composition containing it. Observe that an equality test p = q can be expressed as
γ(p− q).
4.2 Budget Composition
We define a budget as a (conjunctive) composition of entries and zero tests. This com-
position is commutative and associative:
x  y = y  x, (1)
(x  y) z = x  (y  z). (2)
There are two constants for budgets: the empty budget, notation ε, and the null budget,
notation δ. The empty budget stands for the absence of entries or tests, and the null
budget is used to model an erroneous situation which nullifies the entire composition
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containing it. Axioms:
x  ε= x, (3)
x  δ= δ. (4)
Entries with the same attribute can be combined:
a(u) a(v) = a(u+ v). (5)
Note in particular that the composition of a payment a(p) and the receipt a(−p) can be
reduced to a(0). We shall see below that encapsulation both enforces and hides such
synchronizations.
For the axiomatization of the zero tests, we use the property that in the zero-
totalized field for the rational numbers, the division p/p yields zero only if p is equal
to zero; otherwise it yields 1. Axioms:
γ(u) = γ(u/u), (6)
γ(0) = ε, (7)
γ(1) = δ. (8)
For reasoning about budgets with open data terms, we add the following two axioms:
γ(u)γ(v) = γ(u/u+ v/v), (9)
γ(u− v) a(u) = γ(u− v) a(v). (10)
4.3 Encapsulation
For set of attributes H ⊆ A, the operator ∂H(x) encapsulates all entries with attribute
a∈H occurring in x. That is, if the accumulation of quantities in entries with attribute a
equals zero, the encapsulation on a is considered successful and the a-entries disappear;
if the accumulation is not equal to zero, it yields the null budget δ. Axioms:
∂H(ε) = ε, (11)
∂H(δ) = δ, (12)
∂H(γ(u)) = γ(u), (13)
∂H(a(u)) =
{
γ(u) if a ∈ H,
a(u) if a 6∈ H,
(14)
∂H(x ∂H(y)) = ∂H(x)∂H(y). (15)
We further adopt the identities
∂H∪H′(x) = ∂H ◦∂H′(x) and ∂ /0(x) = x.
Example. Consider budget
P def= a(−30) b(10) b(20).
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This budget specifies the expected receipt of amount 30 along channel a and payments
of amount 10 and of amount 20 along b. We compose it with budget
Q def= b(−30) c(30),
which specifies that amount 30 is received along b and sent along channel c. We see
that the payments of P will match the receipt of Q on channel b, so that encapsulation
of b will hide these entries:
∂{b}(P  Q) = a(−30) c(30).
To derive this, first derive that
∂{b}(a(−30) c(30)) = a(−30) c(30)
using axioms (14) and (15). Then:
∂{b}(P  Q) = ∂{b}(a(−30) b(10) b(20)b(−30) c(30))
= ∂{b}(b(0) a(−30) c(30))
= ∂{b}(b(0)∂{b}(a(−30) c(30)))
= ∂{b}(b(0))∂{b}(a(−30) c(30))
= γ(0) a(−30) c(30)
= a(−30) c(30).
Another example. When computing the encapsulation of more than one channel,
we split the encapsulation up, and compute them one by one. Recall that we defined
∂H∪H′(x) = ∂H ◦∂H′(x).
For example, we derive
∂{a,b}(a(0) b(0)) = ∂{a} ◦∂{b}(a(0) b(0)) = ∂{a}(a(0)) = ε.
4.4 Constraints
In the case study in this article, we assume that an absolute operator | | (defined by
|p| = p if p ≥ 0, and |p| = −p otherwise) is part of the signature for rationals. With
this operator we can express inequalities:
γ(|q− p|− (q− p))
expresses the test p ≤ q. For inequality tests we shall then simply write γ(p ≤ q). We
sometimes write γ(p = q) for γ(p− q).
For example, we may design a budget under the constraint
φ
def
= p ≤ q,
and we then compose the budget with the test γ(φ). For the composition under multiple
constraints, say φ and ψ, we may use the notation
γ(φ∧ψ)
def
= γ(φ/φ+ψ/ψ)
(9)
= γ(φ)γ(ψ).
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5 Case Study: MSc Program Budgets
We consider a university department that maintains the three MSc programs A, B and
C. Each program offers a 1-year, 60 EC1 curriculum. These programs need a new bud-
get because of changes concerning budget guidelines, financial reporting, risk manage-
ment and business accounting. Below we develop budgets for the programs. Having
fixed these budgets, the three program managers should negotiate the setting of certain
variables. Having done that the program managers are free to develop their programs
within the constraints of the budget. This process may be viewed as a game aimed at
the design of a single budget where coalitions try to get things their way by imposing
preferred variable settings on other participants. In our case, the program managers
will not hesitate to get money their way at the expense of the other programs or to
prove other programs financially unsound, should they find possibilities to do so in the
new system.2
5.1 Generic Structure of an MSc Program
Each of the three programs has the following structure:
1. An introduction week providing general information.
2. 4 courses of 10 EC each. A course consists of 300 working hours composed
from these ingredients:
• Between 40 and 160 hours of teaching by senior staff.
• Working group meetings supervised by junior staff.
• Unsupervised student team meetings.
• Unsupervised individual experimental work.
• Unsupervised individual homework.
• Participation in an examination.
3. 2 projects of 10 EC each. A project is supervised in one of the following ways:
• Between 5 and 10 hours of internal senior staff supervision.
• At most 20 hours of junior staff supervision.
• At most 5 hours of external staff supervision (performed outside the insti-
tution).
A project ends with a 30-minute presentation (with at least two senior staff mem-
bers present).
1An EC is a unit of student activity/learning outcome in the European Credit Transfer System. One EC
stands for 28 hours of work.
2Mark Burgess (see for instance [4]) advocates the mechanism of autonomous agents making promises
which constrain their actions on a voluntary basis only. A budget proposal might be viewed as a promise
conditional under the counter promise by other parties that they will go along with it. Finding protocols
for distributed budget design in a context of voluntary cooperation is an interesting challenge for further
research.
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4. A formal final degree ceremony.
Each program offers at least two mandatory courses for its own students, and may
offer a number of optional courses that can also be followed by students from the other
programs. An expensive way to implement this is to offer six dedicated courses in the
program and to make two of these compulsory while leaving the students the option to
choose two from the other four courses. A reason to use this kind of planning may be
to let research staff lecture about their advanced topics in order to recruit future PhD
students. Another reason might be to make sure that the entire student population ac-
quires a wide body of knowledge representative of the field as a whole while accepting
that each individual student has acquired knowledge in a more limited scope. A much
cheaper option is to offer only the 2 mandatory courses and to ask the students to take
electives from courses offered by other programs. Reason for doing so may be a lack
of staff or financial resources. Another reason might be the intention to educate a ho-
mogeneous group of experts who will be able to cooperate effectively in forthcoming
projects.
5.2 Joint Budget
In this case study we specify four budgets: budgets A, B, and C, for the respective
programs A, B, and C, and one joint budget J. We start with the joint budget.
All income of the programs from external sources is specified in the joint budget,
and these incoming amounts are received via channel in. The task of the joint budget
is to specify the distribution of the income between the three programs and shared
costs. Payments from the joint budget to the individual program budgets run via the
respective channels a, b, and c. The only shared costs are the payments to the so-called
educational service center (student consulting, time tabling, lecture hall reservation,
facility management, administration); these payments are done via channel e. Picture:
in

J
e
>>||||||||
a
  
  
  
 
b

c
?
??
??
??
?
A B C
When we consider the composition of the four budgets, payments along the channels
a, b and c are considered to be internal. The channels in and e are external; they ‘link’
to parties for which we do not have the budgets.
Notation. The letter X ranges over A, B, C (denoting the programs). We use lower-
case italics for variable names, and uppercase roman for abbreviations.
Variables. The variables used in the specification of the joint budget J are listed in
Figure 1. The values for the variables X:nec and X:ndg are determined by measurement
and monitoring (in practice one may take last years numbers instead). The values for
the variables bbpp and k are determined by negotiation between the program managers.
We shall return to the consequences of the setting of these variables.
9
Set by external authority:
cpec The compensation per EC. Amount obtained when awarding
one EC.
cpdg The compensation per degree. Amount obtained when
awarding one degree.
escf The educational service center fraction (value between 0 and
1) of the overall income to be transferred to the educational
service center.
Set by measurement:
X:nec Total number of EC awarded in courses offered by program
X.
X:ndg Number of degrees awarded in program X.
Set by budget designer/negotiation:
bbpp A fixed amount that serves as the basic budget per program.
This amount is equal for each program and is used to pay
for the program manager, various committee tasks, market-
ing and communication.
k Fraction (value between 0 and 1) of the bbpp which is taken
from the part of the overall income stemming from degree
compensation. The remaining fraction 1− k of the bbpp is
taken from the overall EC compensation.
Figure 1: Variables used in budget J
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Income. The income, received via channel in, consists of two parts.
First, there is the overall EC compensation (ECC), defined as the total number of
EC credits awarded in the three programs, multiplied by the compensation per credit:
NEC def= ∑
X
X:nec,
ECC def= NEC · cpec.
Similarly, there is the overall degree compensation (DGC), defined as the total number
of degrees awarded in the three programs, multiplied by the compensation per degree:
NDG def=∑
X
X:ndg,
DGC def= NDG · cpdg.
Expenses. The educational service center (ESC) takes care of all data base han-
dling, time tabling, logistics, communication and marketing, help desks of various
kinds, international relations and formal ceremony management. There is a joint pay-
ment to the ESC, consisting of the fraction escf of the overall income:
ESC def= escf · (ECC+DGC).
The remainder (1−escf ) ·(ECC+DGC) of the overall income is distributed among
the three programs.
First, each program receives the amount bbpp. Of course, this amount cannot be
more than one third of the available money, so we adopt the constraint
φ1
def
= bbpp≤ (1/3) · (1− escf) · (ECC+DGC).
Furthermore, we require that fraction k of the bbpp is taken from the overall degree
compensation, and the remaining part (1− k) of the bbpp is taken from the overall EC
compensation, leading to the following constraints:
φ2
def
= k ≤ (DGC · (1− escf ))/(3 ·bbpp),
φ3
def
= (1− k)≤ (ECC · (1− escf ))/(3 ·bbpp).
Apart from the fixed amount bbpp, that provides each program with a financial basis
independent of its own student numbers (assuming that the other programs have suf-
ficient numbers of students), each program gets a share of the remaining part of the
overall EC and degree compensation. These shares are proportional to the contribution
that the program has in the overall compensation. The remaining part of the degree
compensation, after subtraction of the expenses on ESC and bbpp, is
DGC · (1− escf )− 3 · k ·bbpp,
and the share of this amount awarded to program X is X:ndg/NDG. So we define
X:DGC def= (DGC · (1− escf )− 3 · k ·bbpp) ·X:ndg/NDG.
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Similarly, we define
X:ECC def= (ECC · (1− escf )− 3 · (1− k) ·bbpp) ·X:nec/NEC.
Each program X receives from the joint budget the amount
X:STAFF def= bbpp+X:DGC+X:ECC.
Budget. Putting everything together, the joint budget J is defined by
J def= γ(φ) in(−ECC) in(−DGC) e(ESC)
a(A:STAFF) b(B:STAFF) c(C:STAFF),
where
φ
def
= φ1∧φ2∧φ3.
Notes. The joint budget has been designed with the following properties in mind.
• By taking bbpp low (or simply zero) each budget gets as much as possible re-
sources proportional to its production in EC and in degrees. By taking bbpp
higher each program budget is provided with a minimum funding with the effect
that each program gets less return on investment for a single EC or degree.
For example, a program with relatively few students may strive for a significant
fixed budget basis bbpp (maybe even bbpp = (1/3) · (1− escf ) · (DGC+ECC)
in an extreme case).
• By taking k low (or simply zero) a maximal reward is provided for programs with
a high yield in terms of degrees. By taking k high (or simply 1) a maximal reward
is given to programs that get as many as possible ECs to students irrespective of
their program and irrespective of whether or not they will complete their degree.
For example, again for a program with relatively few students: choose fraction k
as close as possible to 1 (for all values of bbpp,
k = (1/3) · (DGC · (1− escf ))/bbpp
seems to be a reasonable choice). By taking k as close as possible to 1, the
program will profit the most from students from the other programs following its
courses.
• The following constraints need not be imposed as they follow from the defining
equations, that is by adding these constraints the meaning of the budget will not
change:
∑
X
X:DGC = DGC · (1− escf )− 3 · k ·bbpp,
∑
X
X:ECC = ECC · (1− escf )− 3 · (1− k) ·bbpp.
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Set by external authority:
sscph Senior staff marginal integral cost per hour.
jscph Junior staff marginal integral cost per hour.
Set by program manager:
X:lpf Lecture preparation factor (the number of hours used to pre-
pare one hour of lecturing).
X:sset Senior staff examination time: time needed to set and mark
an exam.
X:sspst Senior staff project supervision time (number of hours spent
by senior staff supervising a single student project).
X:jspst Junior staff project supervision time (number of hours spent
by junior staff supervising a single student project) in addi-
tion to senior staff supervision.
X:ssot Senior staff overhead in total (hours per year).
X:pmt Program management time (hours per year spent by program
manager).
X:C:sslt Senior staff lecturing time (number of hours) for course C.
X:C:jsst Junior staff supervision time (number of hours) for course C.
Figure 2: Variables used in program budgets
5.3 Budgets per Program
In the individual program budgets, the amount received from the joint budget is spent
on the following costs:
• Senior Educational Staff (SES). Compensation for educational working hours
by senior staff.
• Junior Educational Staff (JES). Compensation for educational working hours by
junior staff.
• Program Management (PM). Compensation for all forms of program manage-
ment performed by educational staff.
Variables. The variables used in the program budgets are listed in Figure 2. Within
the constraints set by the educational budget, a program manager can vary the values
for the second set of variables. Needless to say this leads to a combinatorial explo-
sion of options. Setting these variables low implies a sound budget but introduces risk
with student success rates, with student satisfaction monitoring and periodically with
external quality control authorities. Most importantly, however, setting the other vari-
ables very low will cause senior staff to complain about unrealistic requirements and
workloads.
Budgets. Define the senior staff working hours (SSH) and junior staff working
hours (JSH) as follows, with C ranging over the set CX of courses offered by program
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X.
X:SSH def= ∑
C
(X:C:sslt · (1+X:lpf )+X:sset)+X:ndg ·2 ·X:sspst
X:JSH def= ∑
C
(X:C:jsst)+X:ndg ·2 ·X:jspst
The factor 2 in the summands for project supervision stems from the fact that each
student does two projects. Note that project supervision generates compensation only
when students obtain their degree. Failed projects or projects for students failing else-
where in the program will not generate financial resources.
The expenses for senior and junior staff are found by multiplying their hours by
their respective marginal integral costs per hour:
X:SES def= X:SSH · sscph,
X:JES def= X:JSH · jscph.
Finally, the staff costs for program management are given by
X:PM def= (X:ssot+X:pmt) · sscph.
Budgets.
A def= a(−A:SES−A:JES−A:PM)
B def= b(−B:SES− B:JES− B:PM)
C def= c(−C:SES−C:JES−C:PM)
Notes.
1. Both senior staff members and junior staff members may spend two kinds of
hours: regular office hours and spare time hours. The second kind of work is un-
paid. No one will be ever forced to work without compensation but a culture may
exist where this is done on a regular basis. It is quite common to perform unpaid
research work outside regular hours. This is possible for teaching just as well.
Nevertheless there are some constraints. All formal teaching, all introductory
activity, all examinations and all senior and junior staff supervision must take
place within office hours and the cost of this staff time is given by fixed rates per
hour. Office hours are either classified as educational office hours or as research
office hours or as unclassified office hours. If educational activity is performed
in research office hours it need not be paid from the educational budget but it
will be paid from the research budget instead. This mechanism allows a research
group to subsidize its teaching activities from its research budget. That subsidy
may be justified in the case educating a small group of students brings about a
few PhD students who might be very hard to find otherwise.
2. In these budgets per program a formidable amount of freedom exists because all
variables determining the amount of junior and senior staff time spent on courses
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and projects can me defined specifically for each of the programs. If projects are
very close to staff research they may be supervised in (seemingly) less time be-
cause additional unspecified research time is used for the supervision as well
while those hours are not paid from this educational budget. If for instance pro-
gram A has rather few students in comparison with the other two the following
variable settings (or rather suggestions for setting variables) can be helpful:
(a) Set low senior staff hours for project supervision, and compensate that set-
ting with higher junior staff hours and with time paid for from the research
budget which is not viewed as a part of these budgets.
(b) Reduce the number of contact hours in course lecturing while requiring
a significant amount of autonomous work from the students and setting
difficult exam papers. This strategy may backfire when students from the
other programs are supposed to attend the same lectures, however.
5.4 Synchronization of the Budgets
We have presented the four budgets A, B, C, and J. The combined budget is the syn-
chronization
∂{a,b,c}(A  B  C  J).
We derive that it equals
γ(φ∧ψA∧ψB∧ψC) in(−(DGC+ECC)) e(ESC)
where
ψX
def
= (X:STAFF = X:SES+X:JES+X:PM).
Conclusion. This example shows how a modular decomposition of a budget can
be designed. The decomposition is valid under a number of conditions only. If these
conditions are not met, further refinement of the budgets is needed. That can be done
by means of the same notation of course.
These conditions describe an abstraction level in the sense that they rule out cir-
cumstances which may be of practical interest but which are considered an undesirable
overhead at a certain stage of design.
5.5 Further Reflections
Methods of Cost Measurement. Even if one observes the course of action when a
particular program is run in all detail it is still difficult to make a precise statement
concerning its costs. A first difficulty is how to count or incorporate free time hours
made by staff members. A second difficulty is how to decide if any official research
time is used for educational purposes. A third issue is to determine the border between
research and preparation for lectures and project supervision. A further complication
for cost measurement based on observations on how the work is actually done is this:
if staff members are made aware of how their time investment is counted they may
change their behavior. Suppose a staff member often works additional unpaid hours
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at home to get research done and then finds out that a counting system has detected
many hours spent on teaching within the institution. This may lead to the conclusion
that the position will be reclassified into a teaching position with a limited research
task only. Then of course this staff member may be inclined to interchange a number
of educational support activities (marking exams, preparing lectures, etc) with research
activities that were done outside the office hours. Thus a counting system should be
stable in the sense that its introduction should not by itself influence staff behavior in
such a way that the results of counting are modified. In order to obtain this form of
stability staff members should be given a variety of options for formally accounting
their time.
Budgets versus Costs and Planning. Given the combinatorial explosion of options
for planning an MSc program in the formats given above it is an unreasonable request to
‘offer the program in a cheaper form’ unless very clear goals are stated in advance. The
way in which a curriculum (that is, the listing of course titles and of project proposals)
can be offered and planned implies that it is useless to suggest a change on financial
grounds unless a quite clear model of costs and revenues is available and unless a clear
target in that model has been set in advance.
6 Conclusion
We have motivated our interest in a formal theory of budgets, and we have proposed
a simple algebraic theory of budgets based on the tuplix calculus [2]. Quantities are
expressed as functions on the rational numbers, which we have modeled as a totalized
field [3]. As a case study, we modeled budgets and their composition for a university
department offering master programs. We have kept the theory simple, but think of
extensions such as operators for choice (as present in the tuplix calculus), binding of
rational variables, a theory of interfaces and hiding, etc.
As a preliminary conclusion we state that budgets are amenable to formalization in
the the data type tradition of theoretical computer science. The example demonstrates
that formalization can be helpful to specify details which are likely to be missed in a
less formal treatment and which are helpful for a proper understanding. At the same
time, while working on the example, we have drawn the conclusion that designing
budgets in a modular fashion is not an obvious matter and that many more cases studies
will be needed to obtain a stable and formalized structure theory of budgets.
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